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Collaborations between for-profit drug companies and not-for-profit disease
advocacy groups have risen in recent years in an effort to find cures for orphan
diseases. These unique and beneficial collaborations are a result of disease
advocacy groups assuming a more active role in drug development through the use
of “venture philanthropy,” which employs concepts and techniques from venture
capitalism and applies them to achieving philanthropic goals. While these
collaborations have found remarkable success, such as the discovery of the first
known cure for cystic fibrosis in 2012, venture philanthropy for drug discovery
presents numerous legal and social challenges. This Article examines the challenges
presented by these novel partnerships and suggests ways that changes in the law or
regulations can promote these partnerships without undue harm to the overall goal
of advancing research toward cures for patients. The Article further addresses the
issue of when a new product is discovered, if and how disease advocacy groups
should control drug pricing and patient access to the new drug.
I. INTRODUCTION
“The unique and mutually beneficial partnership that led to the approval
of Kalydeco serves as a great model for what companies and patient
groups can achieve if they collaborate on drug development.”1
In January 2012, the FDA approved a new breakthrough drug for cystic fibrosis:
Kalydeco (ivacaftor), the first available drug that treats the cause and not just the
symptoms of cystic fibrosis.2 Cystic fibrosis is the most common fatal genetic
disease among Caucasians, affecting approximately 30,000 people in the United
States.3 The average life expectancy for people with the disease is thirty-eight years.4
1
Press Release, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., FDA approves Kalydeco to treat rare form
of cystic fibrosis (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnounce
ments/ucm289633.htm.
2
Id. Cystic fibrosis causes abnormally thick mucus in the lungs and digestive tract. Id.
The drug Kalydeco (ivacaftor) is for the treatment of a rare form of cystic fibrosis in patients
ages 6 years and older who have the specific G551D mutation in the Cystic Fibrosis
Transmembrane Regulator (CFTR) gene. Id. Of the approximately 30,000 people affected
with the disease in the United States, roughly 1,200 people (4%) are believed to carry the
G551D mutation. Id. While Kalydeco only treats a relatively rare form of cystic fibrosis, it
may lead to additional drugs that treat people impacted by other forms of cystic fibrosis. FDA
Approves Kalydeco (VX-770) — First Drug That Targets the Underlying Cause of Cystic
Fibrosis, CYSTIC FIBROSIS FOUND. (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.cff.org/aboutCFFoundation/
NewsEvents/2012NewsArchive/1-31-FDA-Approves-Kalydeco.cfm.
3

See Press Release, supra note 1.
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While the gene that causes cystic fibrosis was discovered in 1989,5 it has taken over
two decades and a unique collaboration to find a cure.6
The collaboration that gave rise to this drug discovery involved a partnership
between a for-profit bioscience company, Vertex Pharmaceuticals, and a national
nonprofit organization, the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation.7 The impetus for this
collaboration was simple: “the disease is prevalent enough to cause widespread pain,
but too small for profit-minded bioscience companies to risk massive resources in
pursuit of a cure.”8 Thus, the Foundation invested over $45 million into Vertex in
2000 for research and development of a drug for the disease.9 This was “the largest
grant of its kind by a nonprofit disease group.”10 By 2012, the Foundation had
awarded Vertex over $75 million in funding11 and has invested $260 million in drug
development since the mid-1990s.12
When the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation made its initial investment, such “venture
philanthropy” was uncommon.13 As the chief executive, Robert Beall, told one
reporter, it was “the biggest gamble I ever made.”14 Today, however, such
partnerships are becoming more common.15 In 2008, U.S. disease foundations

4
Bruce C. Marshall & Leslie Hazle, PATIENT REGISTRY ANNUAL DATA REPORT 4 (2010),
www.cff.org/UploadedFiles/LivingWithCF/CareCenterNetwork/PatientRegistry/2010-PatientRegistry-Report.pdf.
5

Melissa A. Ashlock & Eric R. Olson, Therapeutics Development for Cystic Fibrosis: A
Successful Model for a Multisystem Genetic Disease, 62 ANNU. REV. MED. 108-09 (2011).
6

Id. at 107-25.

7

Id.; see also Brian McGrory, Driven by Loss, Father Inspires Tireless Pursuit of a Cure,
BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 9, 2012, http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2012
/02/09/joeys_long_legacy/.
8

See McGrory, supra note 7.

9

Matthew Perrone, Kalydeco, Drug That Treats Root Cause of Cystic Fibrosis, Approved
by FDA, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/31/k
alydeco-cystic-fibrosis-cause-drug_n_1244218.html.
10

Id.

11

Id.

12
Richard Haugh, Disease Foundations Prime the Drug Pump, HOSP. & HEALTH
NETWORKS MAG. (Feb. 2012), http://www.hhnmag.com/hhnmag/jsp/articledisplay.js
p?dcrpath=HHNMAG/Article/data/02FEB2010/1002HHN_Inbox_pharmaceutical&domain=
HHNMAG.
13

See Ashlock & Olson, supra note 5, at 116 (stating that the collaboration between
Vertex Pharmaceuticals and the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation “pioneered” the venture
philanthropy business model).
14
15

See McGrory, supra note 7.

Sarah Hanson, Lori Nadig & Bruce Altevogt, VENTURE PHILANTHROPY STRATEGIES TO
SUPPORT TRANSLATIONAL RESEARCH 2 (2009), www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12558
&p=2.
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invested approximately $90 million into for-profit companies for drug
development.16 This was thirteen times more than was invested in 2000.17
The objective of this Article is to examine the benefits and challenges of these
novel partnerships and suggest ways that changes in the laws or regulations can
promote these partnerships without undue harm to the goal of advancing research for
cures for patients. To achieve this objective, Part I describes how partnerships
between disease advocacy groups and for-profit companies have evolved and the
benefits of the new venture philanthropy business model. Part II examines the legal
and social issues of the venture philanthropy model. Part III then proposes various
changes to laws and regulations that could help incentivize these partnerships.
Finally, Part IV addresses the issue of when a new product is discovered, if and how
disease advocacy groups should control drug pricing and patient access to the new
drug.
II. PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN DISEASE ADVOCACY GROUPS AND ACADEMIC AND
COMMERCIAL RESEARCHERS: THE RISE OF VENTURE PHILANTHROPY
“I’ve seen all the elements of drug development from NIH to industry to
academia to being a patient myself . . . nobody has bad intent, it’s just an
old and broken system that really needs to be updated.”18
A. Disease Advocacy Group Funding for “De Novo” and “Repurposed” Drug
Research
Voluntary health organizations, including disease advocacy groups,19 have a
“long-standing history of providing support to those suffering from disease.”20 The
support provided includes offering care, educational resources, participant
recruitment for clinical studies, and funding disease research to develop cures and
novel therapies for particular diseases.21 In terms of novel therapies, these groups

16

U.S. Disease Foundation Investment in Biopharmaceutical Industry up 20% in 2008,
CTR.WATCH NEWS ONLINE (Sept. 5, 2008), http://www.centerwatch.com/news-online/article/1
66/us-disease-foundation-investment-in-biopharmaceutical-industry-up-20-in-2008.
17

Id.

18

Venture Philanthropy on the Rise, 14:8 CENTERWATCH 7 (2007), http://www.themmrf.
org/assets/about-the-mmrf/powerful-news/venture-philanthropy-on-the.pdf.
19

Voluntary health organizations include nonprofit charitable organizations, disease
advocacy groups, and foundations. See Hanson, supra note 15, at 1.
20
21

See Hanson, supra note 15, at 1.

See Hanson, supra note 15, at 1; see Sharon F. Terry et al., Advocacy Groups as
Research Organizations: the PXE International Example, 8 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 157,
164 (2007); David C. Landy et al., How Disease Advocacy Organizations Participate in
Clinical Research: A Survey of Genetic Organizations, 14 GENETICS IN MED. 223, 227 (2012).
A review of journal articles published in 2004 and 2005 reporting on clinical research on
genetic diseases found that 33% of all articles that included a statement regarding research
support acknowledged disease-advocacy group funding. Richard R. Sharp & David C. Landy,
The Financing of Clinical Genetics Research by Disease Advocacy Organizations: A Review
of Funding Disclosures in Biomedical Journals, 152A AM. J. MED. GENETICS PART A 3051,
3051 (2010).
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have been concerned both with the discovery of new drugs, like Kalydeco,22 as well
as finding new uses for old drugs (known as “repurposing”).23
“De novo” drug development is expensive and time consuming.24 Prior to being
marketed in the United States, each drug must undergo a detailed U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) review process. 25 The drug discovery process involves
the following steps: 1) basic research to identify the underlying causes or genetic
mechanism; 2) screening for compounds that show activity with the disease; 3)
optimization of compounds to determine whether a drug candidate might be safe and
effective if taken by humans; 4) identification of the best drug candidate and filing
an IND application with the FDA; 5) clinical trials; and 6) post-marketing studies to
monitor product safety.26 With this process, a new drug takes ten to fifteen years to
develop and $1 billion to $4 billion to bring the drug to the market.27 For every
5,000-10,000 compounds that enter the drug discovery process, only one will be
approved.28
In contrast, developing repurposed drugs can cost half that of “de novo” drugs
because clinical research has already determined the toxicology, safety, dosage, and
side effects of the drugs.29 The federal government also provides incentives for
companies to focus on drug repositioning, especially in the context of rare or
neglected diseases.30 For example, the FDA, through the Orphan Drug Act, provides
some market exclusivity to companies that invest in repurposing drugs for the
treatment for rare diseases, even if the patent term on the drug has expired.31 The
National Chemical Genome Center is also developing a library of approved drugs to
in order for them to be more easily screened for additional uses.32 These incentives
have caused many biotechnology companies to increase their efforts in drug

22

See Press Release, supra note 1.

23

Ramaiah Muthyala, Orphan/rare Drug Discovery Through Drug Repositioning, 8 DRUG
DISCOVERY TODAY: THERAPEUTIC STRATEGIES 71, 71 (2011).
24

See Garret A. FitzGerald, Re-engineering Drug Discovery and Development, 17
LEONARD DAVIS INST. OF HEALTH ECON. 1, 1 (2011).
25
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration is the federal agency responsible for protecting
and promoting public health through the regulation and supervision of food and drug safety.
About FDA, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 2012), http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transpar
ency/Basics/ucm192695.htm. All drugs are required to receive FDA approval before being
placed on the market. 21 U.S.C. §355(a) (2011).
26

Paul T. Nyffeler, The Safe Harbor of 35 U.S.C. §271(e)(1): The End of Enforceable
Biotechnology Patents in Drug Discovery, 41 U. RICH. L.REV. 1025, 1041-44 (2007).
27

See FitzGerald, supra note 24, at 1.

28

See FitzGerald, supra note 24, at 1.

29

Marilyn J. Field & Thomas F. Boat, RARE DISEASES AND ORPHAN PRODUCTS 172 (2011),
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12953;. Muthyala, supra note 23, at 71-76.
30

See FIELD & BOAT, supra note 29, at 172; Muthyala, supra note 23, at 71-76.

31

See FIELD & BOAT, supra note 29, at 172.

32

See FIELD & BOAT, supra note 29, at 172.
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repositioning, especially when business partnerships are available to create market
value in the compounds.33
B. The Shift from the Charitable Granting to Venture Philanthropy
Traditionally, disease advocacy groups provided research funding in the form of
charitable grants to academic or nonprofit researchers to support basic research on a
disease.34 However, many disease advocacy groups began feeling as though the
standard grant approach was not yielding sufficient results.35 Thus, in the late
1990’s, disease advocacy groups began assuming a more active role in drug
development through the use of venture philanthropy.36
In its most basic form, venture philanthropy employs concepts and techniques
from venture capitalism and applies them to achieving philanthropic goals.37 Venture
capitalism is a mechanism for which money from various third-party sources are
invested into typically high-risk areas.38 As part of their investment strategy, venture
capitalists utilize various techniques, including adopting performance measures,
investing larger amounts of money in chosen organizations, partnering closely with
the organizations to provide assistance and produce results, and developing an exit
strategy.39 Unlike traditional charitable grants, the venture philanthropy model treats
funding like an investment, with its corresponding expectations of return, operating
efficiencies, and management oversight.40
Drug advocacy groups are using venture philanthropy to accelerate drug
discovery research for new therapies and cures for diseases.41 Under the venture
philanthropy model, disease advocacy groups are funding not only basic research in
academia, but also translational research and early stages of drug development.42

33

See Muthyala, supra note 23, at 71-76.

34
See FIELD & BOAT, supra note 29, at 168 (“advocacy groups have traditionally provided
support for basic discovery research”).
35

See FIELD & BOAT, supra note 29, at 168.

36

Jessica Potts, Venture Philanthropy: A Case Study of Three Nonprofit Organizations
(Oct. 1, 2011) (unpublished Masters thesis, Kennesaw State University) (on file with Kennesaw State University Library).
37
Venture Philanthropy, WIKIPEDIA (Feb. 2012), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venture
_philanthropy.
38

Christine W. Letts et al., Virtuous Capital: What Foundations Can Learn from Venture
Capitalists, 75 HARV. BUS. REV. 36, 3 (1997), http://www.wheatridge.org/wp-content/uploads
/2012/03/Virtuous_Capital_HB.pdf.
39

Id.

40
Bruce Sievers, IF PIGS HAD WINGS: THE APPEALS AND LIMITS OF VENTURE
PHILANTHROPY 2 (2001), http://cpnl.georgetown.edu/doc_pool/Nielsen0103Sievers.pdf.
41

About Us, ALZHEIMER’S DRUG DISCOVERY FOUND. (Feb. 2012), http://www.alzdisco
very.org/index.php/about/learn-about-venture-philanthropy-faqs.
42

See HANSON, supra note 15.
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This has led them to partner with private sector bioscience companies.43 While
venture philanthropy business models vary among disease advocacy groups,44 most
models have the following key characteristics: fast and flexible grant-making, longterm funding of “high risk, high reward” projects that complement NIH funding,
high levels of disclosure and accountability with transparent performance metrics,
interactive approach to connecting donors with beneficiaries, applying good
governance and management practices, and taking an active, rather than passive
facilitator role.45 The Cystic Fibrosis Foundation is an excellent example of how one
company came to adopt the venture philanthropy business model.46
C. Benefits of the New Model: Removing Risk and Closing Funding Gaps
Venture philanthropy is used to fill funding gaps that arise from drug
development’s economic risks. As described above, drug development entails
considerable time and expense.47 Additionally, of approved drugs, only three of
every ten compounds earn a profit, irrespective of therapeutic area, and only one of
ten becomes a “blockbuster” drug that earns enough profits to fund further

43

Id. (The drug advocacy groups’ goal is to use “funding and strategic leadership to help
draw discoveries out of the academic sector and into the hands of parties with the ability to
commercialize new therapies.”).
44
See Gambrill, supra note 18, at 9-14 (generally describing the different venture
philanthropy models employed by the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation, Multiple Myeloma
Research Foundation, Muscular Dystrophy Association, Juvenile Diabetes Research
Foundation, and Michael J. Fox Foundation for Parkinson’s Research).
45

JOANNE CHANG, BEST PRACTICES FOR VENTURE PHILANTHROPY COLLABORATIONS
BETWEEN DISEASE-FOCUSED FOUNDATIONS AND FOR-PROFIT LIFE SCIENCES COMPANIES 10-12
(2010) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on file with
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Library).
46

The Cystic Fibrosis Foundation is considered a pioneer in developing a successful
venture philanthropy business model as a way to drive drug development for rare diseases.
Media FAQs, CYSTIC FIBROSIS FOUND (Feb. 2012), http://www.cff.org/aboutCFFoundation/P
ressRoom/MediaFAQs/; see also Ashlock & Olson, supra note 5, at 116. Prior to 2000, the
Foundation focused its drug discovery efforts by awarding small grants to academic
researchers. “Cystic Fibrosis Foundation,” ANSWERS.COM (Feb. 2012), www.answers.com/to
pic/cystic-fibrosis-foundation. This support led to the discovery of the cystic fibrosis gene in
1989, which could be used to identify the cause and treatment of the disease. Id. By 1997, the
FDA had approved two drugs for treating the symptoms of cystic fibrosis; however, the
progress was not as great as the foundation had hoped. Id. Around the same time, the
Foundation also experienced a successful partnership with the for-profit bioscience company,
PathoGenesis, which resulted in a top-selling drug product. Id. These experiences led the
Foundation to adopt a new business model that encouraged private companies to conduct
cystic fibrosis drug discovery research. Id. By 2001, the Foundation had given money to
eleven for-profit companies. Id. By 2003, there were around two dozen cystic fibrosis
therapies in development. Id.
47

Venture Philanthropy, WIKIPEDIA (Feb. 2012), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ventur
e_philanthropy.
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research.48 Thus, to help “de-risk” drug development and fill funding gaps, disease
advocacy groups direct money to bioscience companies and translational research.49
First, disease advocacy groups often fund bioscience companies. Traditionally,
bioscience companies have relied on funding from venture capital firms.50 From
1995 to 2005, venture capital investments in the U.S. biotechnology industry
increased from $830 million to almost $4 billion and from 10 to 17 percent of all
U.S. venture capital investments.51 However, a study conducted by the National
Venture Capital Association in 2011 suggests that venture capital is becoming
increasingly unavailable for U.S. bioscience companies. 52 The survey found that
39% of U.S. venture capital firms decreased investments in life science companies
between 2008 and 2011. 53 A similar number of firms expected to further decrease
investments by as much as 30% over the next three years.54 The primary reason cited
for the decline was the increased risk from perceived unpredictability of the FDA
process.55
Second, disease advocacy groups also fund translational research. “Translational
research is a broad term used to describe the process of translating the basic biology
of a disease into [actual] therapeutics.”56 This journey from academia to clinical
trials has been coined the “‘Valley of Death,’ because many therapeutic strategies
start the journey but few finish.”57
Because of the risk, bioscience companies looking for programs to support are
generally not interested in funding risky early-stage drug candidates.58 When
bioscience companies, and their venture capitalist backers, are willing to invest in
early-stage research, they are more likely to focus on potential “blockbuster” drugs,
at the expense of smaller more challenging diseases.59 Thus, without public funding
or investment to help minimize the risk, biotechnology companies generally do not
48
Drug Discovery Process, ALZHEIMER’S DRUG DISCOVERY FOUND. (Feb 2012), http://ww
w.alzdiscovery.org/index.php/alzheimers-disease/hope-through-drugs/drug-discovery-process.
49
Press Release, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, U.S. Medical Innovation at Risk: Fewer
New Companies and Therapies Receiving Funding, Says Report (Oct. 6, 2011), http://sg.fin
ance.yahoo.com/news/U-S-Medical-Innovation-Risk-iw-1103747796.html.
50

Id.

51

Ke Chen et al., How Much Does History Matter? An Analysis of the Geographic
Distribution of Venture Capital Investment in the U.S. Biotechnology Industry, 6 INDUS.
GEOGRAPHER 31, 33 (2009).
52

Press Release, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, supra note 49.

53

Press Release, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, supra note 49.

54

Press Release, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, supra note 49.

55

Press Release, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, supra note 49.

56

Hanson, supra note 15, at 4.

57
Steven Finkbeiner, Bridging the Valley of Death of Therapeutics for Neurodegener ation, 16 NATURE MED. 1227, 1228 (2010).
58

Nuala Moran, Public Sector Seeks to Bridge ‘Valley of Death’, 25 NATURE BIOTECH.
266, 266 (2007).
59

See Hanson, supra note 15, at 3.
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undertake translational research, especially for rare diseases.60 Voluntary health
organizations are one of the only organizations willing and able to fill these funding
gaps.61
III. LEGAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES SURROUNDING THE VENTURE PHILANTHROPY MODEL
“Historically, investigators would apply for a grant from a foundation or
another funding organization and they’d get the grant, and there would
be no oversight, no accountability for what happened with that money. All
of that is changing.”62
While disease advocacy groups are willing to help bioscience companies and
academic researchers balance the risks of drug discovery, their support does not
come without expectations.63 While venture philanthropy models vary among
disease advocacy groups,64 they all utilize at least some venture capitalist tools to
structure the partnerships. This section describes some of the tools used to structure
the partnerships, examines the legal issues involved with one of these tools,
discusses one social issue with venture philanthropy, and then concludes that despite
these issues, the benefits of the model outweigh the negative issues.
A. Structuring the Partnership
Venture philanthropy techniques can help disease advocacy groups achieve three
objectives: control, return on investment, and information sharing. To maintain
control of the research they fund, groups can contractually set milestones and
termination rights, create price restrictions and distribution agreements, and
negotiate for seats on a company’s boards of directors.65 To secure return on
investment in order to fund future research, groups can contract for royalties,
purchase direct equity in a company, or purchase debt in a company.66 Finally, to
ensure information sharing in order to remove some of research impediments,
groups can require assignment of patent rights, research tool sharing and patent
pooling, and even provide access to disease advocacy group-controlled patient
databases and bio-banks.67
B. Legal Issue: Seat on the Board of Directors
While these techniques can help groups meet objectives, they are not without
legal issues. This section will explore the issues presented by placing members of a
60

Hanson, supra note 15 at 3; Gambrill, supra note 18, at 1.

61

Hanson, supra note 15, at 40; Gambrill, supra note 18, at 1. The National Institute of
Health also provides considerable funding for disease research. Chang, supra note 45, at 14.
62

Quote by Linda Van Eldik, Professor in the Department of Cell and Molecular Biology
at Northwestern University Feinberg School of Medicine. See Hanson, supra note 15, at 25.
63

Gambrill, supra note 18, at 7.

64

Gambrill, supra note 18, at 9-14.

65

See Hanson, supra note at 15, at 27-35; Sievers, supra note 40, at 4; Letts, supra note

66

See Hanson, supra note 15, at 27-35.

67

Hanson, supra note 15, at 27-35.

38.
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disease advocacy group on a for-profit company’s board of directors. While legal
issues can also arise with contracting for returns on investment,68 contracting with
researchers to secure patent rights,69 and sharing patient databases or biobanks,70 an
analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper.
In venture capitalism, investors typically assume an ownership role by becoming
actively engaged in the management of the company.71 This often entails taking seats
on the company’s board of directors to help shape strategy, secure other investors,
and steer policy.72 This control helps venture capitalists enhance the growth and
sustainability of the investee company.73
“Based on this model, venture philanthropists are encouraged to become ‘highly
engaged’ in the organizations to which they allocate their funds . . . ”74 As one
scholar pointed out, this “raises sensitive issues of power and control.”75 This paper
explores a director’s fiduciary duty of loyalty to a company and potential conflicts of
interest that may arise when a member of a disease advocacy group takes a director
position in a for-profit company.
Directors of corporations owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and its
shareholders.76 One such fiduciary duty is the duty of loyalty, which requires
68

Hanson, supra note at 15, at 29. Foundations often believe they should receive a return
on their investments. Hanson, supra note at 15, at 29. However, it can be difficult to determine
what portion of the proceeds a particular organization should receive. Hanson, supra note 15,
at 29. The time period between funding translational research and commercializing a drug
may be years. Hanson, supra note 15, at 29. During that time, other investors or grantors may
have contributed to the drug’s development. Hanson, supra note 15, at 29. Determining the
proportion a particular organization should receive can be complex. Hanson, supra note 15, at
29. According to Kenneth Schaner, a private practice attorney with extensive experience in
venture philanthropy, the complexities of the issue often lead to many organizations forgoing
attempts to recapture revenue. Hanson, supra note 15, at 29.
69

See Stanford v. Roche, 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011).

70

See Hanson, supra note 15, at 42-44. The act of opening up patient databases and biobanks can raise issues about confidentiality, privacy, consent, and whether the researchers
should share individual research results with tissue donors. Hanson, supra note at 15, at 42-44.
Confidentiality is an issue because the identity of individuals can be identified from pooled
genomic data. Hanson, supra note at 15, at 42-44. Legal and ethical questions can arise
regarding whether patient consent was needed and obtained. Hanson, supra note at 15, at 4244. Finally, patients that provide samples are often concerned with receiving their individual
results, however, there are generally no agreements between parties for doing so. Hanson,
supra note at 15, at 42-44..
71

See Sievers, supra note 40, at 4.

72

Sievers, supra note 40, at 4.

73

See Letts, supra note 38.

74

See Sievers, supra note 40, at 4.

75

See Sievers, supra note 40, at 4 (focusing on the issues surrounding the inordinate
influence of large donors on nonprofit organizational independence and the challenges that
presents in a civil society).
76

See, e.g., Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del.
1986).
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directors to refrain from self-dealing.77 This includes “refrain[ing] from doing
anything that would work injury to the corporation, or to deprive it of profit . . . ”78
Thus, directors may have an obligation to avoid conflicts of interests,79 and
maximize shareholder returns on investments. 80
Conflicts of interest can arise when a director has another interest that suggests
divided loyalty between the corporation and another constituent.81 Generally,
directors do not owe fiduciary duties to other constituencies whose rights are purely
contractual.82 While many states have adopted “other constituencies” statutes that
permit directors to consider the interests of non-shareholder constituencies in making
corporate decisions, these statutes are only permissive, vary in the constituencies that
are included, and are often vague as to how directors should weigh varying
interests.83 These statutes do not seem to impact litigation outcomes84 and directors
who favor another constituency over its shareholders can still violate their duty of
loyalty.85
Conflicts of interest, and violations of the duty of loyalty, can arise when venture
capital managers serve as directors of companies because of divided loyalty between
the venture capital firm and the investee company.86 Despite the fact that both parties
typically want to maximize returns on investments,87 they nonetheless may face
conflicting interests when, for example, decisions must be made on the terms and
conditions to sell or merge the company.88
77

Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).

78

Id. (emphasis added).

79

See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).

80

Shun Wilson Leung, The Inadequacy of Shareholder Primacy: a Proposed Corporate
Regime that Recognizes Non-Shareholder Interests, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 587, 591
(1997).
81

See Michael W. Peregrine & Robert A. Schreck, Jr., Managing Constituent Interests in
Healthcare Joint Ventures, AHLA CONNECTIONS, Mar. 2012, at 1, http://www.mwe.com/files/
Publication/7ff5a67f-dac2-4494-b525-14842f7ed2fa/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/
6269d2de-b529-421c-86d7-18a781c02716/Analysis2_March20121.pdf.
82

See, e.g., Katz v. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. 1986).
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Brett H. McDonnell, Corporate Constituency Statutes and Employee Governance, 30
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1227, 1230-41 (2004) (describing state constituency statues).
84

Id.
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Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 173 (Del. 1986) (holding that the Board of Directors breached their duty of loyalty due impermissibly considering
noteholders’ interests at the expense of the shareholders).
86

Jin-Kyu Koh & Theresa G. Carroll, Venture Capital Directors—The Heightened Risk of
Serving More Than One Master, 28 MICH. BUS. L.J. 30, 31 (2008) (discussing potential
conflict of interest situations for venture capital designated directors).
87
John Dobson, Is Shareholder Wealth Maximization Immoral?, 55 FIN. ANALYST J. 69,
69 (1999).
88

Marc Weingarten & Neil P. Horne, Be Careful What You Wish For —Considerations
When Obtaining Board Representation, ACTIVIST INVESTING DEV., Spring 2006, at 3, http:/
/www.srz.com/files/News/e5ecb0c3-7c98-40cc-baa9-febbd5e04eb6/Presentation/News
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This Article argues that the risk of such conflicts of interest is heightened when a
member of a disease advocacy group is placed on a for-profit company’s board of
directors. While the board may have an obligation to maximize profits for the
company and its shareholders,89 disease advocacy group members may want to
pursue broader social values, such as maximizing drug distribution at minimized
cost. If conflicts arise, directors can be personally liable for the loss suffered by the
corporation.90 Due to the inherent conflicts of interest and increased risk of liability,
disease advocacy groups may want to forgo requests for board seats.
While relinquishing board seats may be advisable, disease advocacy groups do
not have to relinquish all influence over a board. For example, disease advocacy
groups may still request board observation rights.91 Board observation rights provide
individuals the right to attend and participate in board meetings, but not vote.92
C. Social Issue: Should Nonprofits be Making such Risky Investments?
In addition to potential legal issues, the venture philanthropy business model also
faces numerous social criticisms. One criticism is whether nonprofit organizations
should want to emulate the poor success rates of venture capitalism.93 As one skeptic
points out,
venture capitalists themselves are fond of saying that of every 10
investments, there will be 4 abject failures, 4 walking wounded, and
maybe, if you are lucky, 1 or 2 real hits. Of course, in the financial world,
the big hits make up for the dogs by returning huge profits, but we must
ask whether this success rate is what we wish to emulate.94
The risk assumed by organizations adopting the venture philanthropy model can
be understood by again examining the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation. While the
Foundation was recently successful with the development of Kalydeco, they have
experienced their share of failure from the high risks of such investment ventures.
For example, in 2004-2005 alone, three relatively promising projects were
terminated: Boehringer Ingelheim’s anti-inflammatory drug and Targeted Genetics'
aerosol gene treatment were pulled from Phase II trials; and Amelubant, a
rheumatoid arthritis drug also failed in trials.95 Additionally, in 2010, two
Attachment/862175d5-eedc-4f48-97cb-9117219a7cb5/filesfilesAI_spring06_beCarefulW
hatYouWishFor_WeingartenHorne.pdf.
89

See Guth v. Loft, Inc. 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939); Leung, supra note 80.
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See Koh & Carrol, supra note 86, at 30. Although state statutes can allow corporations
to indemnify their board members for personal liability of a director for a breach of the
director’s duty of loyalty to the corporation. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)
(2012).
91

Koh & Carrol, supra note 86, at 32.

92

Koh & Carrol, supra note 86, at 32.

93

See Sievers, supra note 40, at 2.

94

See Sievers, supra note 40, at 2.

95

Becky Jungbauer & Bridget Silverman, A Breath of Fresh Air for Cystic Fibrosis Drug
Pipeline, 12 PHARM. APPROVAL MONTHLY 12 (Dec. 2007).
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pharmaceutical companies that were partnering with the Foundation had insufficient
capital to finish their projects, leading the Foundation to terminate the partnerships
and establish new partnerships with other companies to continue the project.96 Such
business decisions can cost companies support by investors and may have
contributed to the Foundation’s Charity Navigator Rating to be decreased from a 4star to a 3-star rating in 2011.97
D. Despite these Concerns, Venture Philanthropy has Proven Its Value in
Advancing Disease Research
The venture philanthropy model’s ability to “de-risk” investments in order to
spur private investment is precisely why the model was adopted by many disease
advocacy groups in the first place. As Richard Insel, executive vice president of
research at the Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation (JDRF), has stated: “[i]f we
don’t take on risk as a foundation . . . nobody else is going to take it on . . . the
obligation is on us to take on risk.”98 Many biotechnology companies have admitted
that without the incentive of the venture philanthropy funding, their companies
would never have invested in particular drug development research.99
Because of this need, numerous large disease advocacy groups, including the
Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation, the Michael J. Fox Foundation for
Parkinson’s Research, the Prostate Cancer Foundation, and the Alzheimer’s Drug
Discovery Foundation have adopted venture philanthropy business models in order
to identify and fill gaps in particular disease research funding.100 Like the Cystic
Fibrosis Foundation and Kalydeco, many of these organizations have experience
drug development success.101 The Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation has drug
therapies that have completed the entire cycle from laboratory research to the patient
market,102 and all of the groups have numerous therapeutic drugs in the pipeline.103
Additionally, money is not the only value that these organizations provide to
their venture partners. According to Robert Gallotto, vice president of Altus
Pharmaceuticals, “[c]apital is only one part of the equation. It’s much more the
intellectual capital that was important for us.”104 Even if the public-private
96

See Potts, supra note 36, at 8-9.

97

See Potts, supra note 36, at 9.

98

See Hanson, supra note 15, at 14.

99

Hanson, supra note 15, at 14.

100

See Potts, supra note 36, at 18.

101

Potts, supra note 36, at 18.

102

See Potts, supra note 36,at 19.
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Richard A. Insel et al., Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation: Mission, Strategy, and
Priorities, 21 PROSPECTIVES IN DIABETES 30, 30 (2012); CYSTIC FIBROSIS FOUND., http://www
.cff.org/research/DrugDevelopmentPipeline/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2013); MICHAEL J. FOX
FOUND. FOR PARKINSON’S RESEARCH, http://www.michaeljfox.org/research_fundingOppor
tunities.cfm (last visited Mar. 29, 2013); PROSTATE CANCER FOUND., http://www.pcf.org/si
te/c.leJRIROrEpH/b.7626255/k.A439/July_2011_Advances.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2013);
ALZHEIMER’S DRUG DISCOVERY FOUND., ISOA/ADDF PIPELINE PROJECT REPORT 3 (2008),
www.alzdiscovery.org/pdf/Pipeline_Report.pdf.
104

Gambrill, supra note 18, at 8.
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partnership does not result in the discovery of the targeted drug, the knowledge and
research likely provides transparency to the public and investors on drug
discovery.105
IV. INCENTIVIZING PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR DISEASE RESEARCH
"Culture does not change because we desire to change it. Culture changes
when the organization is transformed; the culture reflects the realities of
people working together every day."106
For all of the reasons stated above, partnerships between disease advocacy
groups and commercial and academic researchers are worth incentivizing. This
section proposes that changes to patent law could help reduce barriers to research on
orphan drugs and incentivize many of these partnerships. This section then explores
the use of priority review vouchers and concludes that such incentive mechanisms
should not be employed for public policy reasons. Other ways to incentivize these
partnerships could include funding research coalitions for disease research, creating
an NIH task force to provide guidelines on the sharing of patient databases and
biospecimen banks,107 reducing fees under the Prescription Drug User Fee Act and
Orphan Drug Act, and changing the tax code to make it easier for disease advocacy
groups to make riskier investments.108 But, these potential incentives are beyond the
scope of this paper.

105

For example, the Alzheimer’s Drug Discovery Foundation measures its impacts by
identifying how many of its funded drug discovery programs advanced key stages in the drug
development process, how many new intellectual property and licenses were secured, the ratio
of time of progressive forward movement through the drug discovery stages to each dollar
invested, the number of peer-reviewed articles published by funded investigators, and the
monetary amount of “follow-on funding” that funded programs have attracted from
government grants and initial public offerings. ALZHEIMER’S DRUG DISCOVERY FOUND.,
ISOA/ADDF PIPELINE PROJECT REPORT 3 (2008), www.alzdiscovery.org/pdf/Pipeline_R
eport.pdf.
106
Frances Hesselbein, The Key to Cultural Transformation, LEADER TO LEADER (Spring
1999), http://www.hesselbeininstitute.org/knowledgecenter/journal.aspx?ArticleID=52.
107
To facilitate partnerships, disease advocacy groups sometimes create research registries
and biological repositories to enable research studies on particular diseases. As described in
the footnotes above, many issues with privacy and confidentiality can arise with these
databases. The Secretary of Health and Human Services assists these organizations by creating
a federal task force to create guidelines on the sharing of patient and biospecimen databases.
The task force would bring together a network of stakeholders from various government
agencies including universities, voluntary health organizations, private biotechnology and
pharmaceutical, and venture capital firms. Peter Lee, Contracting to Preserve Open Science:
The Privatization of Public Policy in Patent Law, 58 EMORY L.J. 889, 889 (2009).
108

For example, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 put in place the private foundation excise
taxes of Chapter 42 to curb perceived abusive behavior by foundations. One of the most
important Chapter 42 excise taxes is aimed at limiting a foundation’s speculative investments
and prohibits against the making of “jeopardizing investments” as set forth in IRC Section
4944 Excise taxes are imposed under this section not only on the private foundations but also
potentially against foundation managers. Tax penalties can be severe. I.R.C. § 4944 (LEXIS
2013).
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A. Patent Law
“In today’s research environment, it is virtually impossible for
researchers to identify a drug candidate without using some patented
invention they do not own.”109
Under federal law, a patent owner has the right to sue anyone who utilizes her
patented invention without permission.110 While patents may provide incentives for
developing new technologies, they constrain access to those technologies, which can
inhibit research and the development of needed therapies.111 Two statutory and
common law exceptions do exist that shield researchers from patent liability in
narrow instances: the safe harbor provision under 35 USC §271(e)(1) and the
common law research exception.112 Unfortunately, judicial limitations to these
provisions have created restrictions and ambiguity regarding their applicability to
research funded by disease advocacy groups in conjunction with for-profit
bioscience companies.
In order to get around these ambiguities, some groups are contractually creating
“biomedical research commons,” where patented inventions are available to
noncommercial researchers.113 However, private ordering does not go far enough; as
described above, many “noncommercial” researchers are often now affiliated with
commercial bioscience companies. This section examines the current state of the
patent law and proposes Congressional amendments to remove impediments to
research on rare or orphan diseases, which would help encourage partnerships
between disease advocacy groups and the private sector.
1. Common Law Experimental Research Exception
Under the common law, the use of a patented invention for research purposes,
and using research tools in drug delivery, was not considered infringement.114
Whether the research exception could be used as a defense to patent infringement,
however, depended on whether the person had an intention of gaining financially
from the endeavor or if there was some commercial benefit.115 If the person gained
financially or commercially, then the exception generally did not apply.116 Thus, the
research exception was not available to pharmaceutical companies, even when they
were seeking FDA approval for generic drugs.117
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Nyffeler, supra note 26, at 1046-47.

110

35 U.S.C. §271 (West 2012).

111

See Lee, supra note 107, at 889.
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Kelli Brensdal, Rough Waters Ahead: The Status of the Safe Harbor Provision After
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(2010).
113

See Lee, supra note 111.
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Until 2002, universities and other nonprofits were believed to be immune from
patent infringement liability under the experimental use defense.118 The Federal
Circuit in Madey v. Duke University disagreed.119 In Madey, the court held that
research conducted at major research universities, such as Duke University, did not
fall under the experimental use exception.120 They explained that the exception only
narrowly covers research performed “for amusement . . . idle curiosity, or for strictly
philosophical inquiry.”121 Thus, the exception is not limited to endeavors for
commercial gain, but also extends to research that furthers the alleged infringer’s
legitimate business.122 While major universities fund many research projects with no
commercial application, the research nonetheless furthers the institution’s legitimate
business objectives, including education, increasing institutional status, and
attracting research grants, students, and faculty.123 The fact that universities may be
non-profit institutions “is not determinative.”124
In effect, Madey disqualified all research universities and nonprofit research
institutions from the experimental use defense.125 Thus, it is highly unlikely that
most drug development ventures between disease advocacy groups and for-profit
bioscience companies could invoke the common law research exception if they
infringed on a patented invention in the course of drug discovery. Under the new
venture philanthropy model, these non-profits have become more commercial in
nature. Additionally, funding disease research furthers their legitimate business
objectives of finding cures for diseases, which can attract additional donors and
federal grants. While disease advocacy groups are still funding basic research, that
research is often directed at academic researchers,126 who are similarly not covered
under the exception. Finally, while some disease advocacy groups have contracted to
provide drugs to patients in certain geographic or socio-economic spheres at no
profit, some of the drugs are still sold to the public for profit.127
Denying the experimental research defense to universities and nonprofit
institutions could have a chilling effect on basic research.128 In theory, research will
cost more and potentially even be slowed as institutions will have to devote more
resources to costly patent searches, negotiate for patent licenses, and pay more due to
royalty stacking of downstream discoveries through reach-through licenses.129 While
118
See Michelle Cai, Madey v. Duke University: Shattering the Myth of Universities’
Experimental Use Defense, 19 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 175, 178 (2004).
119

Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351, 1360-64 (2002).
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one scholar questions whether commercial patent holders will actively exert their
patent rights against universities,130 the new partnerships structured under the
venture philanthropy model may be more targeted due to their commercial
objectives.
2. Statutory Safe Harbor Provision
In 1984, Congress passed 35 USC §271(e)(1), often referred to as the safe harbor
provision, to allow an exception to infringement if the research was “reasonably
related to the development and submission of information” to the FDA.131 The
original intent of this law was to shield drug makers from patent infringement claims
during generic drug development, since they did not fall under the common law
research use exception, while having minimal impacts on patent law. 132 However,
the language of the statute does not limit it to generic drugs.133 Thus, the Supreme
Court has interpreted the safe harbor exemption broadly134
In particular, in 2005 in Merck v. Integra, the Court held that the statute covered
not only generic pharmaceutical drugs for which an IND was submitted, but “all uses
of patented inventions that are reasonably related to the development and submission
of any information under the FDCA.”135 Thus, Merck extended the exception to preclinical research where a
drugmaker has a reasonable basis for believing that a patented compound
may work, through a particular biological process, to produce a particular
physiological effect, and uses the compound in research that if successful,
would be appropriate to include in a submission to the FDA, that use is
‘reasonably related’ to the development and submission of information
under . . . Federal law.’136
However, the Court instructed that the safe harbor exception does not apply to
[b]asic scientific research on a particular compound, performed without
the intent to develop a particular drug or a reasonable belief that the
compound will cause the sort of physiological effect the researcher
intends to induce . . . [be it would not be] ‘reasonably related to the
development and submission of information’ to the FDA.137
Thus, the safe harbor exception should at least begin at the drug optimization
stage, when a drug maker would have both the intent to make a drug and a
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reasonable belief that the compound analyzed would act in the desired manner.138
However, it is more uncertain whether the safe harbor exception would apply if one,
but not both, exceptions were met.139 For example, it is uncertain whether the
exception would apply to the screening stage of drug development where a
researcher has the “intent to develop a particular drug” for FDA approval but may
lack a “reasonable belief” that the compounds she is testing will cause the
“physiological effect the research intends to induce.”140 If screening were included
under this exception, then the safe harbor exception would encompass virtually all of
the drug discovery process.141
As one author eloquently stated “the failure of the legislature and judiciary to
adequately define significant terms regarding the §271(e)(1) safe harbor exemption
has resulted in a governmentally fashioned state of confusion. Within the arena of
drug discovery and biotechnology there is no precise determination of where
infringement stops and exemption begins.” 142 Neither the Supreme Court nor the
Federal Circuit has clarified this issue.143 This is problematic, as uncertainty in this
area could have a chilling effect on drug development, especially due to the threat of
treble damages for findings of willful infringement.144
3. A Proposal for Broader Experimental Use and Safe Harbor Exceptions for
Orphan Drug Development
Scholars and judges have advocated for both broader experimental use
exceptions and clarification of safe harbor exceptions.145 One scholar suggested that
allowing the experimental use exception may be justified in areas where patent
exclusion causes socially harmful results; however, where and who draws the line
between exempted and non-exempted research?146 While funding agencies, such as
the National Institute of Health (NIH), could be used to draw such a line, they might
not be in any better position than the courts.147 Others have proposed bright-line or
138

See Nyffeler, supra note 26, at 1049-50.
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non-routine “submissions that are required to maintain FDA approval,” Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 1358 (2012).
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categorical rules such as eliminating the experimental use defense for universities
entirely,148 or amending §271(e)(1) to state that the safe harbor exemption does not
apply to research tools,149 or is limited to the development of generic drugs.150
This paper combines both of these ideas into the following proposal: Congress
should statutorily extend the experimental use and safe harbor exceptions to orphan
drug research. Thus, basic research on orphan diseases undertaken by academic and
nonprofit organizations would once again be shielded from patent infringement
liability. Perhaps more importantly, it would help reduce the economic risk of early
translational research, which may or may not be covered under the Court’s
interpretation of the safe harbor provision in Merck. This proposal would be both
easy to implement while providing the proper balance between encouraging orphan
drug research and upholding strong patent rights in commercial drug development.
First, this proposal would be relatively easy to implement. It creates a clear
categorical exception since “orphan disease” is statutorily defined under the Orphan
Drug Act as “a disease or condition that affects fewer than 200,000 people in the
United States.”151 In close cases, organizations could potentially submit
documentation that the proposed target population being researched involves fewer
than 200,000 people in the United States to a review agency, such as the FDA, to
receive designation status.152 The FDA could maintain a public database of all
diseases that have received orphan disease status.153
It would also be easy to identify the individuals conducting orphan disease
research. In order to gain funding, scientists must typically claim some practical
implications for their research, such as finding a cure for a particular disease.154
Since many disease advocacy groups encourage or contractually require public
dissemination of research findings supported by their funding,155 individual scientists
or organizations engaged in research on a particular disease may be identifiable.
Also most orphan diseases have a genetic component,156 which may make it possible
to determine exactly what disease or variant is being researched if issues arise.
148

Cai, supra note 109, at 191.

149
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck, 331 F.3d 860, 877-78 (Fed. Cir. 2003); See
Brensdal, supra note 112, at 546.
150

See Nyffeler, supra note 26, at 1060.

151

21 U.S.C. § 360bb (West 2013).

152

This process is similar to that currently undertaken by the FDA for orphan drug
designations. See FIELD & BOAT, supra note 29. Whether or not most diseases would qualify
for orphan status should be relatively easy to identify. For example, “the National Institutes of
Health lists approximately 6000 rare diseases . . . about 83% of these disorders affect fewer
than 6000 patients.” Craig L. Kephart, Orphan Drugs: Small Markets, Big Opportunity,
SPECIALTY PHARMACY TIMES (Feb. 20, 2012), http://www.specialtypharmacytimes.com/p
ublications/specialty-pharmacy-times/2012/February-2012/Orphan-Drugs-Small-MarketsBig-Opportunity.
153
This could be similar to the Rare Disease Repurposing Database that was established by
the FDA.
154

See Cai, supra note 109, at 190.

155

See Hanson, supra note at 15, at 41-44.

156

See FIELD & BOAT, supra note 29, at 1 (“Many of the estimated 5,000 to 8,000 rare

304

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol.:26:285

Second, this proposal strikes the proper balance between encouraging orphan
drug research and upholding strong patent rights in commercial drug development.
The proposal would be consistent with government policy for encouraging orphan
drug research. For example, over the last 30 years, Congress has enacted numerous
statutes, including the Orphan Drug Act157 and the Rare Disease Act of 2002158 in an
effort to reduce the barriers to such research. Even agencies have sought novel
solutions, such as NIH’s Office of Rare Disease Research,159 and the FDA’s recent
launch of its Rare Disease Repurposing Database, which is meant to encourage
venture investing into orphan drugs.160
The benefits derived from such a narrow amendment to patent law would
outweigh any negative impacts. Opponents of expanding experimental use or safe
harbor exemptions express concern that drug researchers would no longer receive
compensation for the patented research tools that they invented.161 Additionally, if
patent protection in drug development was eroded, it could lead to a decrease in
venture capital investments in biotechnology companies because many of the
intellectual property assets generated would essentially be worthless.162 This would
in turn reduce the development of new research tools, which would hurt the overall
pharmaceutical industry.163 However, the narrowness of this proposal should help
alleviate most of those concerns; in most cases, with the exception of orphan drug
research, patent protection would remain unchanged. Thus, orphan drug research
could progress without some intellectual property impediments, but patent holders
would still derive monetary benefit from most bioscience industry research.164
B. Priority Review Vouchers
Priority review vouchers appear popular with Congress for the issue of rare and
neglected diseases. This section describes the Priority Review Voucher program and
argues that the program should not be expanded for public policy reasons.

conditions are genetic or have a genetic component.”).
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On September 27, 2007, the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of
2007 (FDAAA) was signed into law.165 The Act included Section 1102, which added
new section 524 to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 360n).166
Section 524 authorizes the FDA to award a priority review voucher (“PRV”) to
sponsors of drugs or vaccines for certain tropical diseases upon approval of the
tropical disease product application.167 A PRV entitles the holder to obtain priority
review for any new future drug application that would not otherwise quality for
priority review.168 A PRV can be used by the sponsor who obtains it or may be
transferred or sold to another party.169 By enacting Section 524, Congress sought to
“stimulate new drug development by offering additional incentives for obtaining
FDA approval of certain tropical disease drug products.”170
Proponents for PVRs argue that they are “a powerful new incentive” for
companies to invest in the treatment of tropical diseases. 171 A voucher could be
worth $50-500 million,172 and the benefits derived could include reducing FDA
review by four to 12 months and allowing for earlier market entry, which could give
a company greater advantage over competition.173
Enamored by the possibilities of these new vouchers, in March 2011, four
senators cosponsored a bipartisan bill, the Creating Hope Act of 2011, which would
amend the FDC Act § 524 to expand the priority review voucher program to include
rare pediatric diseases.174 The bill was designed to “encourage the development of
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treatments for children with serious rare diseases.”175 In September 2011, the House
introduced a companion bill.176 The President signed the Creating Hope Act of 2011
into law on July 9, 2012.177
In theory, it would be possible to expand PVRs to encompass all orphan diseases.
However, this Article argues that while PVRs have much appeal, they present
numerous public policy issues that outweigh their value. First, while the vouchers
have received much attention and support for helping to spur research and
innovation, at writing, the FDA has only issued a single PRV since the program
began in 2007,178 begging the question of whether they are in fact incentivizing
research.
Second, the program invokes many concerns such as: whether the vouchers could
slow the review of other drugs;179 whether such drugs will ever reach the intended
affected population since the program does not require sponsors to have secured a
manufacturer willing to produce them;180 and whether a drug subjected to priority
review could pose greater safety risks due to faster reviews.181 This Article will
explore the first issue.182 In particular, Congress needs to consider whether we want
to prioritize drugs that should never have priority in the first place, especially when it
may slow down priority review for other much needed drugs. An FDA priority
175
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review designation “was meant to shorten the review time of products that represent
major advances in treatment or that treat conditions for which no adequate therapy
exists, such as certain types of cancer and infection with the human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV).”183 For such treatments, priority review is
reasonable.184 However, under the voucher program, drugs “for which there is little
or no clinical urgency [may] be subject to accelerated deadlines . . . ”185 In order to
analyze those drugs more quickly, the FDA must employ additional resources.186
Proponents of the program have argued that the costs of those additional
resources are recovered through the special user fee that must be paid by the
company that uses the PRV for one of its products.187 With the user fee, proponents
argue that it should not be necessary for the FDA to slow other drugs awaiting
approval.188 While this argument appears convincing, its proponents fail to consider
the realities of government appropriations and the risk that system presents.
Under the PRV program, the special user fees collected each year are deposited
and credited as offsetting collections to the account providing appropriations to the
Food and Drug Administration.189 Offsetting collections are authorized to be credited
to the account from which they will be spent at the program or account level, and
remain there until expended.190 However, offsetting collections can encourage
appropriations committees to reduce spending.191 This is because “[u]nder current
scorekeeping rules, a committee that cuts spending in a program gets credit for the
savings (and an increase in offsetting collections is treated as a decrease in
spending).”192 Thus, large influxes of money from the PRV special user fees could
result in additional cuts to FDA appropriations. This is problematic. The 2012 State
of the FDA identified agency funding as the greatest threat to the FDA’s future.193 In
183
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184

See Kesselheim, supra note 182.

185

See Kesselheim, supra note 182.

186

See David B. Ridley & Henry G. Grabowski et al., Developing Drugs for Developing
Countries, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 313, 315 (2010).
187
Id. at 318; see Sonderholm, supra note 182, at 415; see also Grabowski, supra note 179.
For 2012, the special user fee is $5,280,000, which represents the estimated cost incurred by
the Agency for priority review of a drug. Fee for Using a Priority Review Voucher in Fiscal
Year 2012 Notice, 76 Fed. Reg. 53910 (Aug. 30, 2011).
188
See Ridley & Grabowski, supra note 186, 319-20; see Sonderholm, supra note 182, at
415; See Grabowski, supra note 179, at 7.
189

21 U.S.C. § 360n (West 2013).

190

The Federal Budget: A Primer, TRUTH ABOUT POLITICS, http://www.truthandpolitics.o
rg/budget-basics.php (Last visited March 9, 2013).
191

Pearl Richardson, The Growth of Federal User Fee Charges, U.S. CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE (1993) at 34.
192
193

Id.

Steve Grossman, FDA Progress “At Risk:” An Update on Funding and a Call to Action,
FDA MATTERS, THE GROSSMAN FDA REPORT (March 25th, 2012), http://www.fdamatters.c
om/?cat=11.

308

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol.:26:285

FY 12, the agency received only a small increase in appropriated funding, and FDA
faces potential cuts in FY 13.194
Additionally, Congressional mandates and amendments to the user fee
reauthorization legislation will impose new unfunded requirements on the agency
beyond what will be paid for by user fees.195 Thus, FDA employees will already be
overextended; a large influx of PRVs would only compound this problem, even if
sponsors must pay a special user fee. This could result in slower priority review
times and delay in getting life-saving drugs into the market.
V. WHEN A NEW DRUG IS DISCOVERED, SHOULD DISEASE ADVOCACY GROUPS
CONTROL PRICING AND ACCESS?
“The intention of orphan drug legislation . . . is to make the development
of drugs for orphan diseases profitable. The unintended consequence is
exploitation of the rules for profit. Like tax avoidance, this is legal, but
not necessarily desirable.”196
As discussed above, the new drugs developed through public-private partnerships
could significantly improve the lives of many people.197 However, there is concern
that the drugs will be unaffordable and inaccessible to many people suffering from
diseases.198 This section explores that issue and suggests that disease advocacy
groups partnering with for-profit bioscience companies should try to contract for
patient drug access using a tiered pricing system.
A. Orphan Drugs can be Expensive and May Not be Accessible to Everyone Affected
by the Disease
Orphan drugs are some of the most expensive drugs in the world, costing as
much as $400,000 per year per individual.199 Many of the costs of developing a new
drug are incurred regardless of the target population size.200 Thus, companies argue
that they must set high prices to recover drug development costs and make a
profit.201 Due to the market exclusivity provisions of the Orphan Drug Act, there
may be only one drug on the market to treat the disease;202 however, people are often
194
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willing to pay high prices, and insurance companies lack leverage to negotiate lower
prices.203
Even after patent and market exclusivity ends, orphan drugs face less price
competition than nonorphan drugs.204 For nonorphan drugs, generic drug
competition will often drive down drug prices within six to twelve months of generic
market entry.205 However, fewer generic drugs are available for orphan diseases, in
part, due to the small market potential.206 Even when a generic is developed, it may
only charge a slightly lower price (e.g. 15% less) than the brand-name drug.207
Substantial price drops for nonorphan drugs typically only occur once additional
generic competitors enter the market.208 However, the development of multiple
generic drugs for orphan diseases is less likely, resulting in overall limited price
competition.209 For these reasons, orphan drugs have monopolistic power, leading to
their high prices.210 Thus, despite small markets, orphan drugs can be very
profitable,211 and even result in “blockbuster orphans.”212
In one sense, the intention of the Orphan Drug Act has worked; financial
incentives now exist for companies to develop treatments for rare disorders,213
companies are able to make profits on orphan drugs, and there have been over 350
orphan drugs approved by the FDA since the Act was enacted in 1983.214
Unfortunately, companies seemed to have exploited the system,215 and the rationales
commonly cited for high prices may not apply to all drugs. For example, although
companies often cite high research and development costs as a motivating factor in
the high pricing of orphan drugs, the argument does not apply to all orphan drugs.
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As described above, many orphan drugs are repurposed drugs that had already
received FDA approved for another use. In these instances, the research and
development costs are substantially less.216
Additionally, marketing costs for orphan diseases should be substantially lower
than non-orphan drugs, since target populations are small.217 Furthermore, disease
advocacy groups are generally active in informing those afflicted by the disease of
new treatments, which can decrease marketing costs.218
The high prices of many orphan drugs have very real consequences: the drugs
may be unaffordable, and thus unavailable, for many people afflicted by rare
diseases.219 Many individuals lack health insurance coverage and would be unable to
afford such high costs on their own.220 Individuals that seek coverage after being
diagnosed with a disease have historically found it difficult to obtain insurance at all,
let alone affordable insurance.221 Finally, even if an individual has health insurance,
many plans may cover the drugs but require substantial patient cost sharing.222 These
same people may then be without coverage when treatment costs exceed their plan’s
lifetime cap or drive premiums unaffordably high.223
B. Public-private Partnership Contracts for Tiered Pricing Systems are a Good
Mechanism to Control Orphan Drug Prices
The issue of affordability and orphan drugs has attracted considerable
attention.224Aside from federal price controls, numerous arguments have been made
216
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that the drug industry should at least be encouraged to make drugs for rare diseases
reflect value based pricing.225 At least one scholar as suggested that public-private
partnerships could be one mechanism for making drugs more affordable.226 This
Article expands on that idea and proposes that drug advocacy groups, when
partnering with commercial and academic researchers, should attempt to contract for
tiered-pricing structures that could allow public companies to make a profit while
also making drugs available to people unable to pay.227 In the context of drug
products, tiered pricing is a mechanism that adapts a product’s price to the
purchasing power of consumers in different geographical or socio-economic
segments.228
There are at least three recent examples of how public entities have controlled the
prices of therapies developed in conjunction with private sector companies, two of
which have used tiered pricing mechanisms in an attempt to provide affordable
therapies for patients. The first partnership involves the state of California. In 2005,
the state of California established the California Institute for Regenerative Medicine
(CIRM) through a state-wide ballot measure.229 The measure provided over $3
billion for stem cell research and allowed CIRM to allocate the money through
grants and loans.230 These grants and loans are governed by numerous regulations,
some of which helped to ensure that Californians pay a fair price for drugs they
helped create. 231 For example, CIRM requires that for-profit grantees must submit a
plan on how uninsured Californians would access a drug produced wholly or partly
from CIRM-funded research.232 Furthermore, the drug must be sold at a price
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provided for under the California Discount Prescription Drug Program.233 The need
for tiered pricing formulas has also been examined.234
The second example involves a partnership between the Drugs for Neglected
Diseases Initiative, a non-profit research and development organization, and the
world’s third largest pharmaceutical company, Sanofi-Aventis.235 In 2004, the
partnership was formed in order to develop a fixed-dose anti-malarial drug.236 As
part of the agreement, Sanofi-Aventis agreed not to seek patent protection on the
drug and to sell it at cost to public health organizations.237 In early 2007, the
partnership launched its first anti-malarial drug.238 As of 2010, over 80 million
treatments had been purchased and the drug was registered in 30 sub-Saharan
African countries and in India.239 The wide success and availability of the drug is
due, in part, to a tiered-pricing policy.240 The tiered pricing policy allows for “no
profit-no loss” pricing for the drug in the public sectors, including governments and
non-profit NGOs.241 The same drug is then also sold in the private sector under a
different brand name at market prices to allow for profit margins.242 Thus, the public
sector pays less than $1 for adults and $0.50 for children per day, while the brand
name drug is sold for $2-3 to wholesalers that supply the private market.243
The third example involves the partnership between the Cystic Fibrosis
Foundation and Vertex Pharmaceuticals, which produced the drug Kalydeco,
described above. While a year’s supply of the drug will cost $294,000, Vertex has
agreed to provide the medicine for free to people with no insurance and with
household incomes of $150,000 or less.244 Furthermore, the company will cover 30
percent of co-pay costs for select patients who have insurance.245
As demonstrated above, tiered pricing systems have been successful, at least in
some cases, in lessening at least one of the barriers to drug access−drug pricing.246
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Thus, disease advocacy groups should consider the use of price control mechanisms
when forming partnerships with commercial and academic researchers. However, the
ability of disease advocacy groups to secure such contractual price controls may
depend on their ability to derisk the venture, which may depend on the amount of
initial funding, likelihood of future funding, their ability to provide access to patients
for clinical trials, their ability to reduce marketing and advertising costs through
access to patient registries, the potential market size for the drug, and the availability
of orphan drug tax credits and market exclusivity.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, partnerships between disease advocacy groups and commercial
and academic researchers present exciting new possibilities for drug development,
including the development of orphan drugs. This paper advocates for Congress to
support these new partnerships by amending the patent law to create a federally
sanctioned “biomedical patent commons” for orphan disease research. Congress
should not continue to expand the Priority Review Voucher program due to the
negative impacts that it could have on the priority review process and overall agency
funding. Finally, when disease advocacy groups do partner with bioscience
companies, tiered pricing systems appear to be a goodway to ensure that people
unable to pay for therapies can nonetheless gain access to them.

